In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is a distinctive type of judgment that can be meaningfully labeled “aesthetic”, and that these judgments are distinctively different from other types of judgments. We argue that, within an Aristotelian framework, there is no clear avenue for meaningfully differentiating “aesthetic” judgment from other types of judgment, and, as such, we aim to question the assumption that aesthetic judgment does in fact constitute a distinctive kind of judgment (...) that is in need of, or can be subject to, distinctive theorizing. We advance our argument primarily through demonstrating that leading contemporary accounts of aesthetic judgment do not successfully distinguish a type of judgment in that they do not tell us how making an aesthetic judgment differs substantially from judging that 2 + 3 = 5, that football is entertaining, or that today is Tuesday. (shrink)

A key source of support for the view that challenging people’s beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N = 268, N (...) = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests. (shrink)

Differing worldviews give interdisciplinary work value. However, these same differences are the primary hurdle to productive communication between disciplines. Here, we argue that philosophical issues of metaphysics and epistemology subserve many of the differences in language, methods and motivation that plague interdisciplinary fields like educational neuroscience. Researchers attempting interdisciplinary work may be unaware that issues of philosophy are intimately tied to the way research is performed and evaluated in different fields. As such, a lack of explicit discussion about these assumptions (...) leads to many conflicts in interdisciplinary work that masquerade as more superficial issues. To illustrate, we investigate how philosophical assumptions about the mind may influence researchers in educational neuroscience. The methods employed by researchers in this field are shaped by their metaphysical beliefs, and arguments around these issues can threaten accepted disciplinary ontologies. Additionally, how a researcher understands reduction in the special sciences and how they place their colleagues in this ontology constrains the scope of interdisciplinary projects. In encouraging researchers to explicitly discuss the philosophical assumptions underlying their research we hope to alleviate some of the conflict and establish realistic expectations for collaborative projects. (shrink)

Recent scholarship in intellectual humility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH focuses on a proper recognition of the impact of intellectual limitations and a motivation to overcome them, placing it as the mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. We developed the Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale to assess this conception of IH with related personality constructs. In Studies 1 (...) (n= 386) and 2 (n = 296), principal factor and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a three-factor model – owning one's intellectual limitations, appropriate discomfort with intellectual limitations, and love of learning. Study 3 (n = 322) demonstrated strong test-retest reliability of the measure over 5 months, while Study 4 (n = 612) revealed limitations-owning IH correlated negatively with dogmatism, closed-mindedness, and hubristic pride and positively with openness, assertiveness, authentic pride. It also predicted openness and closed-mindedness over and above education, social desirability, and other measures of IH. The limitations-owning understanding of IH and scale allow for a more nuanced, spectrum interpretation and measurement of the virtue, which directs future study inside and outside of psychology. (shrink)

Recent discussion of mechanism has suggested new approaches to several issues in the philosophy of science, including theory structure, causal explanation, and reductionism. Here, I apply what I take to be the fruits of the 'new mechanical philosophy' to an analysis of a contemporary debate in evolutionary biology about the role of natural selection in speciation. Traditional accounts of that debate focus on the geographic context of genetic divergence--namely, whether divergence in the absence of geographic isolation is possible (or significant). (...) Those accounts are at best incomplete, I argue, because they ignore the mechanisms producing divergence and miss what is at stake in the biological debate. I argue that the biological debate instead concerns the scope of particular speciation mechanisms which assign different roles to natural selection at various stages of divergence. The upshot is a new interpretation of the crux of that debate--namely, whether divergence with gene flow is possible (or significant) and whether the isolating mechanisms producing it are adaptive. (shrink)

C endorses the doctrine of Composition as Identity, which holds that a composite object is identical to its many parts, and entails that one object can be identical to several others. In this dialogue, N argues that many‐one identity, and thus composition as identity, is conceptually confused. In particular, N claims it violates two conceptual truths: that existence facts fix identity facts, and that identity is no addition to being. In response to pressure from C, N considers several candidate interpretations (...) of the first slogan. Each interpretation imagines God issuing a divine existential decree that counts as ‘fixing the existence facts’, and then considers what questions about identity are left open by it. N eventually hits on an appealing interpretation of the slogan that C can neither undermine nor accommodate, and uses it to interpret the second slogan as well. (shrink)

Aristotle rightly holds that the constitution of a city is not entirely captured by its written documents or official political structures. More fundamentally, the constitution of a city is made up of its real and deep habits, customs, relations, expectations, aspirations, and ideals of the people who live there. The aim here is to articulate five values that together constitute what I will call close-knit cities: a) ecological resiliency; b) intimate proximity; c) social heterogeneity; d) fairness; e) social trust. I (...) give a brief account of each of these values alone, along the way showing how each value needs the others to be fully realised, and ultimately argue that at least most cities should aspire to become close-knit cities because they simultaneously realise environmental stewardship and enable human flourishing. (shrink)

This essay is my review of Colleen Dyble’s book, Taming Leviathan: Waging a War of Ideas around the World. Dyble is affiliated with the legendary classical liberal British think tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs. Her anthology is a collection of essays by people around the world who have been involved with similar free-market think tanks in countries with historically statist economic systems. These writers include Greg Lindsay, founder of the Center for Independent Studies in Australia; Margaret Tse, of the (...) Instituto Liberdade in Brazil; Michael Walker, co-founder of the Fraser Institute in Canada; Cristian Larroulet, of Libertad y Desarrollo in Chile; Giancarlo Ibarguen, of the Center for Economic and Social Studies in Guatemala (which actually founded a free-market-oriented university); Parth Shah, founder of the Center for Civil Society in India; Daniel Doron, co-founder of the Israeli Center for Social and Economic Progress; Alberto Mingardi, of the Instituto Bruno Leoni in Italy; Masaru Uchigama, founder of the Japanese for Tax Reform; Elena Leontjeva, co-founder of the Lithuanian Free Market Institute; Alexander Magno, co-founder of the Foundation for Economic Freedom in the Philippines; and last, Leon Louw, of the Free Market Foundation of South Africa. I then discuss seven important reasons why classical liberal think tanks are so important in modern societies. (shrink)

This essay is my review of Philip Booth’s Wellbeing and the Role of Government. The book is an anthology of original articles by eminent researchers in modern happiness economics, such as: Booth himself; Paul Omerod; David Sacks, Betsey Stephenson, and Justin Wolfers; Christopher Snowden; J. R. Shackleton; Christian Bjornskov; Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne; and Pedro Schwartz. I conclude by offering several criticisms of the work.

In this article I define a strong conditional for classical sentential logic, and then extend it to three non-classical sentential logics. It is stronger than the material conditional and is not subject to the standard paradoxes of material implication, nor is it subject to some of the standard paradoxes of C. I. Lewis’s strict implication. My conditional has some counterintuitive consequences of its own, but I think its pros outweigh its cons. In any case, one can always augment one’s language (...) with more than one conditional, and it may be that no single conditional will satisfy all of our intuitions about how a conditional should behave. Finally, I suspect the strong conditional will be of more use for logic rather than the philosophy of language, and I will make no claim that the strong conditional is a good model for any particular use of the indicative conditional in English or other natural languages. Still, it would certainly be a nice bonus if some modified version of the strong conditional could serve as one. -/- I begin by exploring some of the disadvantages of the material conditional, the strict conditional, and some relevant conditionals. I proceed to define a strong conditional for classical sentential logic. I go on to adapt this account to Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox, to S. C. Kleene’s logic K3, and then to J. Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł, a standard version of fuzzy logic. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots. Defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior. Simulations of a computer-controlled, nonliving autonomous robot cannot carry the same psychological meaning as animate behavior. Being a living creature is an essential link between genuinely expressive behavior and justified psychological ascriptions.

In this article, I suggest that combining resources from philosophy and psychology can yield useful tools for philosophical counselling. More specifically, I argue for three theses: a) Iris Murdoch’s notion of just attention and Marshall Rosenberg’s method of non-violent communication are interestingly compatible; b) engaging in non-violent communication serves to support one’s endeavors to acquire the kind of clear vision Murdoch thinks doing well by others requires; and c) non-violent just communication would be beneficial to both counsellors and counselees (...) and thus a useful resource for philosophical counsellors. (shrink)

Are science and religion compatible when it comes to understanding cosmology (the origin of the universe), biology (the origin of life and of the human species), ethics, and the human mind (minds, brains, souls, and free will)? Do science and religion occupy non-overlapping magisteria? Is Intelligent Design a scientific theory? How do the various faith traditions view the relationship between science and religion? What, if any, are the limits of scientific explanation? What are the most important open questions, problems, or (...) challenges confronting the relationship between science and religion, and what are the prospects for progress? These and other questions are explored in Science and Religion: 5 Questions--a collection of thirty-three interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the world's most influential and prominent philosophers, scientists, theologians, apologists, and atheists. Contributions by Simon Blackburn, Susan Blackmore, Sean Carroll, William Lane Craig, William Dembski, Daniel C. Dennett, George F.R. Ellis, Owen Flanagan, Owen Gingerich, Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, John F. Haught, Muzaffar Iqbal, Lawrence Krauss, Colin McGinn, Alister McGrath, Mary Midgley, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Timothy O'Connor, Massimo Pigliucci, John Polkinghorne, James Randi, Alex Rosenberg, Michael Ruse, Robert John Russell, John Searle, Michael Shermer, Victor J. Stenger, Robert Thurman, Michael Tooley, Charles Townes, Peter van Inwagen, Keith Ward, Rabbi David Wolpe. (shrink)

CARACTERÍSTICAS GERAIS DO GADO BOVINO -/- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CATTLE BOVINE -/- CARACTERÍSTICAS GENERALES DEL GANADO BOVINO -/- 1 TAXONOMIA DOS BOVINOS -/- Consideramos, nesse primeiro tópico, a taxonomia (ordenação e classificação das espécies animais e vegetais, onde também pode-se encontrar a relação de familiaridade entre organismos distintos e/ou iguais, bem como sua evolução em diversos aspectos: físico, motor, locomoção, anatomia, etc.) dos bovinos. É levado em consideração os itens mais relevantes e mais estudados em Zootecnia, Biologia, Medicina Veterinária, etc. (...) Observe o quadro a seguir: -/- Phylum -/- Chordata/Cordados (com espinha dorsal) -/- Subphylum -/- Vertebrata/Vertebrados -/- Classe -/- Mammalia/Mamíferos (pelos na pele e glândulas mamárias desenvolvidas) -/- Subclasse -/- Theria -/- Infraclasse -/- Eutheria -/- Ordem -/- Artrioctyla/Artiodátilos (dois dedos; 3 e 4 falanges) -/- Subordem -/- Ruminantia/Ruminantes (sem incisivos superiores e quatro compartimentos) -/- Infraordem -/- Pecora -/- Família -/- Bovidae -/- Gênero -/- Bos -/- Espécie -/- Taurus -/- Subespécie -/- Taurus ou Indicus -/- 2 CARACTERÍSTICAS ANATÔMICAS, BIOLÓGICAS E ZOOTÉCNICAS -/- Apresento as principais características quanto ao regime alimentar, à anatomia estomacal que faz com que o animal seja denominado de ruminante e a dentição dos bovinos. Observe o quadro que se segue: -/- Estômago -/- Composto por quatro compartimentos, em ordem: Rúmen, Retículo, Omaso e Abomaso -/- Regime alimentício -/- Herbívoros (alimentam-se de gramíneas e forrageiras) -/- Dentição -/- Incompleta; ausência de pinças superiores e caninos -/- 3 PARÂMETROS PRODUTIVOS E REPRODUTIVOS IDEAIS -/- Na bovinocultura é comum trabalhar com parâmetros de produção e reprodução que devem ser respeitados e atingidos em uma propriedade, tanto para o produtor obtiver lucros e investir em seu plantel quanto visando à saúde e o bem-estar dos animais. Observe alguns padrões mais relevantes no quadro: -/- Lactância -/- 305 dias (10 meses, segundo a raça trabalhada) -/- Intervalo entre partos (IEP) -/- 11.5 – 12.5 meses e até 18 meses -/- Idade ao primeiro parto -/- 24 – 25 meses (raças europeias) -/- Dias abertos2 (período de serviço) -/- 50 – 150 dias -/- Serviços por concepção -/- 1 – 2 -/- % de concepção ao primeiro serviço -/- 60% -/- % de concepção ao segundo serviço -/- 80% -/- % de concepção ao terceiro serviço -/- 90% -/- % de vacas paridas por ano -/- 90% -/- Substituições -/- 18 – 30% -/- % máxima de mortalidade fetal -/- < 5% -/- % máxima de mortalidade em vacas -/- 2% -/- % de resíduos não-genéticos -/- Até 10% -/- 4 CARACTERÍSTICAS REPRODUTIVAS FISIOLÓGICAS DO MACHO (BOI) -/- Na bovinocultura, seja de corte ou leiteira, é necessário entender os animais quanto as suas principais características reprodutivas para que o produtor possa tomar as devidas providências na hora da estação de monta, no período de concepção, de gestação e pós-gestação visando uma melhor eficiência reprodutiva, bem como aos lucros provindos do rebanho. Observe o quadro abaixo: -/- Volume por ejaculação -/- 4 ml (variando entre 2 – 10 ml) -/- Número de espermatozoides -/- 4000 – 5000 milhões -/- Local da inseminação -/- Vagina da vaca -/- Tempo de chegada do sêmen ao oviduto -/- 2 – 13 minutos -/- Número de espermatozoides que chegam ao oviduto -/- 4200 - 27500 -/- Vida fértil do espermatozoide -/- 30 – 48 horas -/- Tempo da ejaculação -/- 1 segundo -/- Porcentagem ideal de motilidade -/- 75% -/- Porcentagem ideal de células normais -/- 95% -/- pH do sêmen -/- 6,7 – 6,9 (6,8 de média) -/- Idade à puberdade -/- 10 meses (podendo haver variações entre 6 – 10 meses) -/- Idade à primeira monta/uso do sêmen (inseminação artificial) -/- 18 – 24 meses -/- 5 CARACTERÍSTICAS REPRODUTIVAS FISIOLÓGICAS DA FÊMEA (VACA) -/- Se é importante atentar-se as informações acerca do sistema reprodutivo e andrológico do macho, com a fêmea esse cuidado e atenção deve ser ainda maior, uma vez que é ela que gerará o futuro do rebanho do produtor. É necessário atentar-se e dar ênfase à uma série de procedimentos pré e pós-parto. Observe o quadro a seguir: -/- Tipo de reprodução -/- Poliéstrico contínuo -/- Idade à puberdade -/- 7 – 18 meses (11 meses no gado europeu) -/- Maturidade sexual -/- 14 – 18 meses no gado europeu -/- Peso à puberdade -/- 300 kg (200 – 450 kg para a classe de grandes raças) -/- Duração do ciclo estral -/- 21 dias (18 – 24 de variação) -/- Momento da ovulação -/- 12 horas após a finalização do estro -/- Vida fértil do óvulo -/- 20 – 24 horas -/- Óvulos liberados -/- 1 – 2 (a poliovulação é possível) -/- Implantação3 do embrião -/- 40 dias -/- 6 ALTERAÇÕES OCORRIDAS DURANTE O PERÍODO DE GESTAÇÃO -/- É necessário dar ênfase à alguns aspectos relevantes na bovinocultura como a duração da gestação de uma vaca, em média, o total de crias que ela favorece ao produtor, etc. todos esses apontamentos deverão ser colocados em um documento para que se possa manter a qualidade e a boa produção e produtividade do plantel. Os aspectos no quadro abaixo são os mais primordiais para o conhecimento de leigos e até mesmo de trabalhadores da área veterinária e/ou zootécnica. Todos os dados obtidos são uma média, que foi obtida por meio de pesquisas e práticas com os animais. -/- Duração da gestação -/- 283 dias -/- Número de crias ao parto -/- 1 – 2 (sendo que 2 são em raras ocasiões) -/- Tipo de placenta -/- Epiteliocorial/Cotiledonária -/- Tempo de implantação -/- 30 – 40 dias após a cópula -/- Início do período seco4 -/- Aos 10 meses de lactação e aos 7 meses de gestação -/- Duração do período seco -/- 2 meses -/- 7 SINAIS PRÉVIOS AO PARTO -/- Antes do parto das vacas, é necessário que a atenção seja redobrada, temos que observar a anatomia exterior de certas compartições como a vagina, a mudança comportamental também deve ser observada, todos esses cuidados visam a sanidade tanto da vaca quanto do neonato. Por isso, é viável que todo e qualquer parto seja observado à distância seja pelo criador ou o trabalhador da propriedade, visando a possível ajuda no parto do animal caso o neonato passe por complicações na hora do nascimento. Um dos grandes vilões que aumentam o percentual de mortalidade de neonatos é as possíveis complicações na hora do nascimento, o animal pode ficar preso e morrer, como denomina-se de distorcia. Observe os fatores a serem levados em consideração no quadro abaixo. -/- Edema vulvar -/- Acúmulo anormal de muco na vagina -/- Distensão de ligamentos -/- O primeiro compartimento a se distender é a vagina para a facilitação da passagem do neonato -/- Edema abdominal e mamário -/- Acumulação de líquidos anormal no abdômen e no úbere -/- Gotejamento do colostro -/- 12 – 24 horas antes do parto -/- Inquietações -/- As vacas prontas pra parir ficam inquietas, hiperativas -/- Inapetência -/- As vacas cortam a alimentação por conta própria -/- Isolamento -/- As vacas que, normalmente andam em rebanho, se isolam em um determinado lugar para que possa parir -/- 8 CONSTANTES FISIOLÓGICAS -/- Essas constantes de temperatura, frequência cardíaca e respiratória além dos movimentos ruminais, servem de base para que o produtor mantenha seu rebanho sob controle veterinário e que, mediante quaisquer alterações nos dados apresentados, o produtor deverá comunicar ao médico veterinário da propriedade para que possam ser tomadas as devidas providências. Observe o quadro: -/- Temperatura -/- 37,5 – 38,5 °C (adultos) -/- 38,5 – 39,5 °C (jovens) -/- Frequência cardíaca -/- 40 – 80 batimentos/minuto (adultos) -/- 80 – 110 batimentos/minuto (jovens) -/- Frequência respiratória -/- 10 – 30 respirações/minuto (adultos) -/- 15 – 45 respirações/minuto (jovens) -/- Movimentos ruminais -/- 2 – 3 movimentos/2 minutos -/- 9 pH (POTENCIAL HIDROGENIÔNICO) DE ALGUMAS SECREÇÕES CORPORAIS -/- Fator importante para discernir os líquidos dos bovinos e dividi-los em ácidos ou básicos, isto é, se são ácidos ou alcalinos. O pH varia entre 0 – 14 e sua média é 7 (neutro), pHs acima de 7 são considerados alcalinos, porventura, pHs abaixo de 7 são considerados ácidos. Observe o quadro: -/- Leite -/- 6,5 – 7 (neutro) -/- Urina -/- 7,4 – 8,4 (alcalina) -/- Sangue -/- 7,3 – 7,5 (neutro) -/- Líquido ruminal -/- 5,5 – 7 (ácido) -/- Líquido abomasal -/- 2 – 3 (ácido) -/- Saliva -/- 7,9 – 8,5 (alcalina) -/- 10 VALORES SANGUÍNEOS NORMAIS DOS BOVINOS -/- Esses valores são utilizados como padrão principalmente para pesquisas no ramo da Ciência Animal. Todavia, são imprescindíveis para atentar-se à saúde e ao bem-estar dos animais, uma vez que, possíveis alterações anormais, ocasionam complicações futuras que, por sua vez, implicará em gastos ao produtor com assistência veterinária constante e medicamentos. Observe o padrão dos valores no quadro seus valores e, em notas de rodapé, as significações biológicas e médicas dos mesmos. -/- Hemoglobinas5 -/- 8,15 gramas/decilitro (g/dl) -/- Hematócritos6 -/- 24,5% (precisamente 24,46%) -/- Eritrócitos/hemácias/glóbulos vermelhos7 -/- 5 – 10 milhões/milímetro cúbico (mm3) -/- Reticulócitos8 -/- 0 -/- Plaquetas9 -/- 100 mm3 -/- Leucócitos/glóbulos brancos10 -/- 4000 – 12000 mm3 -/- Neutrófilos segmentados11 -/- 15 – 45% -/- Neutrófilos banda -/- 0 – 2% -/- Linfócitos12 -/- 45 – 75% -/- Monócitos13 -/- 2 – 7% -/- Eosinófilos14 -/- 2 – 20% -/- Basófilos15 -/- 0,2 -/- 11 QUÍMICA SANGUÍNEA DOS BOVINOS -/- Quantidade de micro e macronutrientes existentes no sangue, pode não parecer importante, mas esses padrões quando, porventura, esses números alterem-se implicará em patologias interiores e exteriores necessitando-se, assim, de mão de obra especializada, ou seja, um médico veterinário. Observe o quadro a seguir: -/- pH sanguíneo (venoso) -/- 7,4 (precisamente 7,38) -/- Proteínas plasmáticas -/- 6,8 g/dl -/- Cálcio (Ca) -/- 9 – 11 miligramas/decilitro (mg/dl) -/- Fósforo (P) -/- 5 – 9 mg/dl -/- Magnésio (Mg) -/- 2 – 3 mg/dl -/- Sódio (Na) -/- 132 – 245 miliequivalentes/litro (mEq/L) -/- Potássio (K) -/- 4,1 – 5,1 mEq/L -/- Glicose -/- 50 – 70 mg/dl -/- Nitrogênio (N) urético no sangue -/- 5 – 20% -/- Creatinina16 -/- 1,5 mg/dl -/- Cobre (Cu) -/- 0,7 – 1,3 partes por milhão (ppm) -/- Chumbo (Pb) -/- 0 – 0,15 ppm -/- Fibrinogênio17 -/- 300 – 800 mg/dl -/- Bilirrubina18 total -/- 0,1 – 1,6 mg/dl -/- Bilirrubina livre -/- 0 – 1 mg/dl -/- Bilirrubina conjugada -/- 0,6 mg/dl -/- Ferro (Fe) -/- 100 – 200 mg/dl -/- TGO (transaminase glutâmico oxalacética)19 -/- 100 – 50 UI -/- TGP (transaminase glutâmico pirúvica) -/- 3 – 15 UI -/- FA (fosfatase alcalina) -/- 30 – 50 UI -/- CPK (creatinofosfoquinase)20 -/- 30 – 50 UI -/- LDH (lactato desidrogenase)21 -/- 300 – 600 UI -/- GGT (gama glutamil transferase) -/- 4,9 – 26 UI -/- HCO (bicarbonato) -/- 28 mEq/L -/- Nota: Atualmente, a medicação da TGO está caindo em desuso, em seu lugar mede-se AST (aspartato aminotransferase). Da mesma forma, utiliza-se a ALT (alanina aminotransferase) no lugar da TGP. -/- 12 CONSTANTES FISIOLÓGICAS DO APARELHO DIGESTIVO -/- Esses padrões servem para que o produtor possa ter um alicerce da quantidade de água e de alimentos (feno, silagem, palhas, etc.) que o animal deverá consumir para que possa produzir de forma eficiente e gerar lucros futuros para a propriedade. Observe o quadro abaixo: -/- Consumo de alimentos à livre acesso -/- 3% do peso vivo (PV) – (feno de ótima qualidade) -/- 2,2% do PV – (silagem) -/- 1% do PV – (palhas) -/- Consumo de água -/- 10% do PV dividido em 4 períodos: -/- 3,6 – 4,3 litros de água/kg de matéria seca (MS) -/- 50 – 80 litros de água/dia (alimentos secos) -/- 24 – 40 litros de água/dia (alimentos verdes) -/- 14 – 16 % do PV (mais de 5 litros/L de leite) -/- pH ideal da água deverá estar entre 6 – 9. -/- 13 CARACTERÍSTICAS DA RUMINAÇÃO -/- Os bovinos são animais de produção peculiares, isto é, é um dos animais com uma capacidade completamente enorme para um criador, estamos falando do fato de digerir alimentos fibrosos, especialmente os volumosos, e transformá-los em carne, leite, etc. Isso ocorre porque nos bovinos, como em caprinos, ovinos, etc. há a presença do rúmen em seu aparelho estomaco-digestivo. A ruminação consiste, basicamente, na regurgitação do alimento semi-digerido, o alimento primeiramente é consumido e vai para o primeiro compartimento, o rúmen, lá às bactérias e os protozoários começam a desagregação das fibras existentes no alimento, depois o alimento volta a boca do animal em que o mesmo agrega saliva e o mastiga novamente para ir ao retículo. Observe as características peculiares da ruminação no quadro: -/- Início e regularização (1° arroto) -/- 2 – 3 semanas de idade -/- Início (depois do alimento ingerido) -/- 5 – 15 horas após a ingestão -/- Número de períodos da ruminação -/- 4 – 24 períodos/dia (segundo a quantidade da frequência cardíaca (FC) e do tamanho das partículas -/- Total de regurgitações -/- 15 – 20 -/- Volume ruminado -/- 40 – 60 kg ao dia -/- Duração por período de ruminação -/- 10 – 60 minutos cada uma -/- Número dos bolos alimentares regurgitados -/- 360 - 790 -/- Peso dos bolos alimentares ruminados -/- 80 – 120 g -/- Movimentos mastigatórios e tempo de mastigação por bolo alimentar -/- 40 – 70 movimentos e o tempo de 45 – 60 segundos -/- Tempo da ruminação -/- 7 horas (variação conforme raça: 3 – 8 horas) -/- 14 COR NORMAL DAS FEZES -/- Na bovinocultura, de corte ou leite, é sumamente imprescindível atentar-se à todos os tipos de detalhes no animal, por exemplo, se está associado ao grupo, se está alimentando-se regularmente e normalmente, se está ruminando de forma normal e, até mesmo, a cor e a consistência das fezes exoneradas. Esse fator de coloração e consistência implica na sanidade do animal. Observe o quadro elaborado, segundo quantidades de clorofila, bílis, tipo de alimentação, etc. -/- Bezerro (período de amamentação) -/- Cor amarelada para o cinza -/- Bovino adulto (ruminante) -/- Verde escuro (pastagens) -/- Amarronzado (estábulo) -/- Amarelo pardo (engorda com concentrado/grãos) -/- Consistência: pastosa -/- Odor: ligeiramente desagradável -/- 15 CARACTERÍSTICAS DAS ESTRUTURAS DIGESTIVAS/COMPARTIMENTOS -/- Nos bovinos há a presença de 4 aparelhos estomacais, sendo o último, o abomaso, o estômago verdadeiro, isto é, o estômago químico do animal, antes disso, há a presença do rúmen que é o compartimento que faz dos animais ruminantes peculiares na pecuária, o retículo e o omaso. Observe o quadro abaixo: -/- Rúmen (Pança) -/- Proporção ocupada ante os compartimentos -/- 80% do lado esquerdo da cavidade abdominal -/- Capacidade -/- 200 – 250 litros ou 135 kg de material alimentício (adultos de raças pesadas) -/- pH do líquido -/- 5,5 – 7 -/- Movimentos ruminais -/- 2 – 3 movimentos/2 min. -/- Cor normal do líquido ruminal -/- Geralmente verde acinzentado -/- Consistência -/- Ligeiramente viscosa -/- Odor -/- Aromático e pouco repulsivo -/- Proporção bacteriana -/- 1 x 109 a 1 x 1010 /ml -/- Proporção protozoária -/- 1 x 102 a 1 x 106 /ml -/- Função -/- Digestão de celulose, hemicelulose e amido. -/- Fermentação de açúcar a acetato, propionato e butirato. Oxidação e absorção de acetato, propionato e butirato. -/- Assimilação de açúcares, minerais e nitrogênio no corpo microbiano. Bem como a absorção de outros íons. Produção de gases, ácidos graxos voláteis e massa microbiana -/- Retículo (bonete, coifa, barrete, crespina) -/- Tamanho -/- 5% de todo compartimento estomacal -/- Projeção -/- 6° à 8° costelas esquerdas -/- Função -/- Regurgitação na -/- ruminação e eructação. Também participa na fermentação -/- Omaso (saltério, filho, folhoso) -/- Tamanho -/- 7% de todo o compartimento -/- Projeção -/- 7° à 9° costelas esquerdas -/- Função -/- O omaso permite a reciclagem da água e de alguns minerais como o fósforo e o sódio que retornam ao rúmen pela saliva. Serve como objeto de transição entre as distintas fermentações do rúmen e do retículo. Grande capacidade de absorção de água, sódio, fósforo e ácidos graxos residuais e voláteis -/- Abomaso (coagulador, coalheira, estômago verdadeiro) -/- Tamanho -/- 7 – 9% de todo o compartimento -/- Projeção -/- Sobre o piso da cavidade ligeiramente à direita da linha média, desde o apêndice xifoide até o umbigo -/- Função -/- Digestão ácida. Secreção de enzimas digestivas e do ácido clorídrico (HCl) que mata os microrganismos. Digere alimentos não fermentados no rúmen (algumas proteínas e lipídeos). Digestão peptídica de microrganismos. -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- JARDIM, V. R. Bovinocultura. 1ª ed. Campinas: Instituto Campineiro de Ensino Agrícola, 1973. -/- _____________.; JARDIM, L. M. B. F.; TORRES, A. di P. Manual de Zootecnia: raças que interessam ao Brasil. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Agronômica Ceres, 1982. -/- ROSENBERGER, G. et al. Exame clínico dos bovinos. 1ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 1993. (shrink)

Many believe that the rational evaluation of actions depends on the rational evaluation of even basic desires. Hume, though, viewed desires as "original existences" which cannot be contrary to either truth or reason. Contemporary critics of Hume, including Norman, Brandt and Parfit, have sought a basis for the rational evaluation of desires that would deny some basic desires reason-giving force. I side with Hume against these modern critics. Hume's concept of rational evaluation is admittedly too narrow; even basic desires are, (...) despite their nonrepresentational nature, subject to rational evaluation. But this evaluation is not relevant to their tendency to generate reasons for action, and does not undermine the spirit of the Humean view of rational action. (shrink)

That parthood is a transitive relation is among the most basic principles of classical mereology. Alas, it is also very controversial. In a recent paper, Ingvar Johansson has put forward a novel diagnosis of the problem, along with a corresponding solution. The diagnosis is on the right track, I argue, but the solution is misleading. And once the pieces are properly put together, we end up with a reinforcement of the standard defense of transitivity on behalf of classical mereology.

These essays draw on work in the history and philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and language, the development of concepts in children, conceptual..

A lot of work in metaphysics relies on linguistic analysis and intuitions. Do we want to know what sort of things there are or could be? Then let’s see what sort of things there must be in order for what we truthfully say to be true. Do we want to see whether x is distinct from y? Then let’s see whether there is any statement that is true of x but not of y. And so on. In this paper I (...) argue that this way of proceeding is full of traps and is bound to be pretty useless unless we already have a good idea of what sort of things there are, and of how we are going to count them. (shrink)

SNePS, the Semantic Network Processing System 45, 54], has been designed to be a system for representing the beliefs of a natural-language-using intelligent system (a \cognitive agent"). It has always been the intention that a SNePS-based \knowledge base" would ultimatelybe built, not by a programmeror knowledge engineer entering representations of knowledge in some formallanguage or data entry system, but by a human informing it using a natural language (NL) (generally supposed to be English), or by the system reading books or (...) articles that had been prepared for human readers. Because of this motivation, the criteria for the development of SNePS have included: it should be able to represent anything and everything expressible in NL; it should be able to represent generic, as well as speci c information; it should be able to use the generic and the speci c information to reason and infer information implied by what it has been told; it cannot count on any particular order among the pieces of information it is given; it must continue to act reasonably even if the information it is given includes circular de nitions, recursive rules, and inconsistent information. (shrink)

We argue that there is a conflict among classical theism's commitments to divine simplicity, divine creative freedom, and omniscience. We start by defining key terms for the debate related to classical theism. Then we articulate a new argument, the Aloneness Argument, aiming to establish a conflict among these attributes. In broad outline, the argument proceeds as follows. Under classical theism, it's possible that God exists without anything apart from Him. Any knowledge God has in such a world would be wholly (...) intrinsic. But there are contingent truths in every world, including the world in which God exists alone. So, it's possible that God contingently has wholly intrinsic knowledge. But whatever is contingent and wholly intrinsic is an accident. So, God possibly has an accident. This is incompatible with classical theism. Finally, we consider and rebut several objections. (shrink)

The theory according to which most ordinary objects are mere “entia successiva”—sequences of distinct mereological aggregates, whose unity resides exclusively in our minds—is a variant of the standard, three-dimensional conception of objects. For the aggregates are, at bottom, endurants, i.e., entities that persist through time by being fully present at any time at which they exist. In this paper I compare this theory with the so-called “stage view”, according to which ordinary objects—indeed, all objects—are sequences of momentary entities that cannot (...) truly be said to persist through time. Both theories face a number of intuitive difficulties but the stage view, I argue, has a lot more to offer in return. (shrink)

Intersectionality has become the primary analytic tool that feminist and anti-racist scholars deploy for theorizing identity and oppression. This paper exposes and critically interrogates the assumptions underpinning intersectionality by focusing on four tensions within intersectionality scholarship: the lack of a defined intersectional methodology; the use of black women as quintessential intersectional subjects; the vague definition of intersectionality; and the empirical validity of intersectionality. Ultimately, my project does not seek to undermine intersectionality; instead, I encourage both feminist and anti-racist scholars to (...) grapple with intersectionality's theoretical, political, and methodological murkiness to construct a more complex way of theorizing identity and oppression. (shrink)

Skipper and Millstein analyze natural selection and mechanism, concluding that natural selection is not a mechanism in the sense of the new mechanistic philosophy. Barros disagrees and provides his own account of natural selection as a mechanism. This discussion identifies a missing piece of Barros's account, attempts to fill in that piece, and reconsiders the revised account. Two principal objections are developed: one, the account does not characterize natural selection; two, the account is not mechanistic. Extensive and persistent variability causes (...) both of these difficulties, so further attempts to describe natural selection as a mechanism are also unlikely to succeed. (shrink)

It is shown that a complete axiomatization of classical non-tautologies can be obtained by taking F (falsehood) as the sole axiom along with the two inference rules: (i) if A is a substitution instance of B, then A |– B; and (ii) if A is obtained from B by replacement of equivalent sentences, then A |– B (counting as equivalent the pairs {T, ~F}, {F, F&F}, {F, F&T}, {F, T&F}, {T, T&T}). Since the set of tautologies is also specifiable by (...) purely syntactic means, the resulting picture gives an improved syntactic account of classical sentential logic. The picture can then be completed by considering related systems that prove adequate to specify the set of contradictions, the set of non-contradictions, and the set of contingencies respectively. (shrink)

We lay out the fatalist’s argument, making sure to clarify which dialectical moves are available to the libertarian. We then offer a more robust presentation of Ockhamism, responding to obvious objections and teasing out the implications of the view. At this point, we discuss presentism and eternalism in more detail. We then present our argument for the claim that the libertarian cannot take Ockham’s way out of the fatalism argument unless she rejects presentism. Finally, we consider and dispense with objections (...) to our argument. In the end, it ought to be clear that the libertarian must make a choice between Ockham’s way out and presentism. (shrink)

We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report our mental states. (...) Success in these strategies will depend on the view we take of speakers' understanding of the words they use to speak their minds. The key is to avoid circularity in the account of how they know what they mean; for if knowing what one is saying in speaking a language provides a means of knowing one's own mind, it cannot simply be a part of it. I shall look at ways in which we might proceed here, and examine whether the strategy can make room for a genuinely first-person point of view. But first let me try to motivate the problem of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Current challenges in medical practice, research, and administration demand physicians who are familiar with bioethics, health law, and health economics. Curriculum directors at American Association of Medical Colleges-affiliated medical schools were sent confidential surveys requesting the number of required hours of the above subjects and the years in which they were taught, as well as instructor names. The number of relevant publications since 1990 for each named instructor was assessed by a PubMed search.In sum, teaching in all three subjects combined (...) comprises less than two percent of the total hours in the American medical curriculum, and most instructors have not recently published articles in the fields they teach. This suggests that medical schools should reevaluate their curricula and instructors in bioethics, health law, and health economics. (shrink)

D O N A L D D AV I D S O N’S “ Meaning and Truth,” re vo l u t i o n i zed our conception of how truth and meaning are related (Davidson    ). In that famous art i c l e , Davidson put forw a rd the bold conjecture that meanings are satisfaction conditions, and that a Tarskian theory of truth for a language is a theory of meaning for that language. (...) In “Meaning and Truth,” Davidson proposed only that a Tarskian truth theory is a theory of meaning. But in “Theories of Me a n i n g and Learnable Languages,” he argued that the finite base of a Tarskian theory, together with the now familiar combinatorics, would explain how a language with unbounded expre s s i ve capacity could be learned with finite means ( Davidson    ). This certainly seems to imply that learning a language is, in p a rt at least, learning a Tarskian truth theory for it, or, at least, learning what is specified by such a theory. Davisdon was cagey about committing to the view that meanings actually a re satisfaction conditions, but subsequent followers had no such scru p l e s . We can sum this up in a trio of claims: Davidson’s Conjecture () A theory of meaning for L is a truth-conditional semantics for L. () To know the meaning of an expression in L is to know a satisfaction condition for that expression. () Meanings are satisfaction conditions. For the most part, it will not matter in what follows which of these claims is at stake. I will simply take the three to be different ways of formulating what I will call Davidson’s Conjecture (or sometimes just The Conjecture). Davidson’s Conjecture was a very bold conjecture. I think we are now in a.. (shrink)

Goldman, though still a reliabilist, has made some recent concessions to evidentialist epistemologies. I agree that reliabilism is most plausible when it incorporates certain evidentialist elements, but I try to minimize the evidentialist component. I argue that fewer beliefs require evidence than Goldman thinks, that Goldman should construe evidential fit in process reliabilist terms, rather than the way he does, and that this process reliabilist understanding of evidence illuminates such important epistemological concepts as propositional justification, ex ante justification, and defeat.

In previous work I have argued that talk about negative events should not be taken at face value: typically, what we are inclined to think of as a negative event (John’s failure to go jogging) is just an ordinary, positive event (his going to the movie instead); it is a positive event under a negative description. Here I consider more closely the difficulties that arise in those cases where no positive event seems available to do the job, as with putative (...) cases of causation by omission. In particular, I elaborate on Helen Beebee’s idea that not all causal explanations are reports of causation. When we mention John’s failure to turn off the gas as an explanans of why there was an explosion, we do not say what caused the explosion. We do not mention any of the relevant causes. We just remark that one sort of event that was supposed to occur, and whose occurrence would have prevented the explosion, did not in fact occur. (shrink)

Skeptics of the moral case against industrial farming often assert that harm to animals in industrial systems is limited to isolated instances of abuse that do not reflect standard practice and thus do not merit criticism of the industry at large. I argue that even if skeptics are correct that abuse is the exception rather than the rule, they must still answer for two additional varieties of serious harm to animals that are pervasive in industrial systems: procedural harm and institutional (...) oppression. That procedural and institutional harms create conditions under which abuse is virtually inevitable only increases the skeptic's burden. (shrink)

Extension is probably the most general natural property. Is it a fundamental property? Leibniz claimed the answer was no, and that the structureless intuition of extension concealed more fundamental properties and relations. This paper follows Leibniz's program through Herbart and Riemann to Grassmann and uses Grassmann's algebra of points to build up levels of extensions algebraically. Finally, the connection between extension and measurement is considered.

Many biologists and philosophers have worried that importing models of reasoning from the physical sciences obscures our understanding of reasoning in the life sciences. In this paper we discuss one example that partially validates this concern: part-whole reductive explanations. Biology and physics tend to incorporate different models of temporality in part-whole reductive explanations. This results from differential emphases on compositional and causal facets of reductive explanations, which have not been distinguished reliably in prior philosophical analyses. Keeping these two facets distinct (...) facilitates the identifi cation of two further aspects of reductive explanation: intrinsicality and fundamentality. Our account provides resources for discriminating between different types of reductive explanation and suggests a new approach to comprehending similarities and differences in the explanatory reasoning found in biology and physics. (shrink)

Assuming that events form a genuine ontological category, shall we say that a good inventory of the world ought to include “negative” events—failures, omissions, things that didn’t happen—along with positive ones? I argue that we shouldn’t. Talk of non-occurring events is like talk of non-existing objects and should not be taken at face value. We often speak as though there were such things, but deep down we want our words to be interpreted in such a way as to avoid serious (...) ontological commitment. (shrink)

The paper is written in response to those who fail to recognize the relation between a patient's mental competency and her state of pain. Some clinicians claim that a proper diagnosis can only be made in the absent of analgesia. Rather, the patient's state of pain directly affects her mental competency and thus her ability to give valid consent. Clinicians should rethink their approach to diagnosis when the patient is in pain.

We propose the beginnings of a general theory of environments, of the parts or regions of space in which organisms live and move. We draw on two sources: on the one hand on recent work on the ontology of space; and on the other hand on work by ecological scientists on concepts such as territory, habitat, and niche. An environment is in first approximation a volume of space; it is a specific habitat, location, or site that is suitable or adequate (...) for given purposes (of foraging, resting, hunting, breeding, nesting, grooming) in the life of an organism or group of organisms. This spatial notion of environment can be drawn closer to biological and ecological science by taking account of the pertinent physical attributes realized within given spatial regions. (shrink)

Deception sometimes results in nonconsensual sex. A recent body of literature diagnoses such violations as invalidating consent: the agreement is not morally transformative, which is why the sexual contact is a rights violation. We pursue a different explanation for the wrongs in question: there is valid consent, but it is not consent to the sex act that happened. Semantic conventions play a key role in distinguishing deceptions that result in nonconsensual sex (like stealth condom removal) from those that don’t (like (...) white lies). Our framework is also applicable to more controversial cases, like those implicated in so-called “gender fraud” complaints. (shrink)

A dialogue among statements that try to explain to each other the mechanisms and peculiarities of self-referential assertions and, particularly, of their context-dependence.

The general hypothesis underlying this work is that mereology (the study of the relations between an entity and its parts) and topology (understood as the study of the qualitative relations of connection and compactness) may jointly constitute adequate grounds for the formal-ontological analysis of the world of ordinary experience. The analysis focuses on certain minimal (structural) principles on the basis of which different philosophical theories may be erected.

Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable (...) for its consequences. The standard argument against free choice asserts that free choice cannot exist because determinism, as a property of laws governing the cosmos, excludes such a possibility. This contingent factual claim, however, has always proven problematic. Contemporary discussions - no doubt aware of this disputed factual premise - draw upon a more novel, and arguably more devastating critique: free will must be rejected because its very conception is incoherent. Rather than assuming the existence of determinism and attempting to show its incompatibility with free will, this argument begins with consideration of the idea of free choice and concludes that, if it is to have any sense at all, it must be compatible with determinism. Obviously, no single treatment of the free will problem could address all its nuances. This Article more modestly offers one possible approach to the question. Part I elaborates in more detail the view that the traditional conception of free choice is incoherent and, thus, inevitably undermines the very responsibility it is asserted to constitute; Part II considers the resulting effort to develop a model of human freedom compatible with determinism; and Part III, drawing upon the prior discussions, describes - in terms of classical action theory - a conception of free choice justifying personal moral and legal responsibility that avoids both the incoherence of "uncaused freedom" as well as the shortcomings of determinism. (shrink)

The Doctrine of Potential Parts says that proper undetached parts are merely potential entities, entities that do not exist but would exist if they were detached from the rest. They are just aspects of the whole to which they belong, ways in which the whole could be broken down, and talk of such parts is really just talk about the modal properties of the whole. Here I offer a reconstruction of this doctrine and present an argument to illustrate its hidden (...) kinship with another, parallel but independent doctrine Doctrine of Potential Wholes. According to this second doctrine, disconnected wholes (i.e., wholes that are not in one piece) are in turn potential entities, entities that do not exist but would exist if their parts were suitably conjoined. (shrink)

This paper investigates the view that digital hypercomputing is a good reason for rejection or re-interpretation of the Church-Turing thesis. After suggestion that such re-interpretation is historically problematic and often involves attack on a straw man (the ‘maximality thesis’), it discusses proposals for digital hypercomputing with Zeno-machines , i.e. computing machines that compute an infinite number of computing steps in finite time, thus performing supertasks. It argues that effective computing with Zeno-machines falls into a dilemma: either they are specified such (...) that they do not have output states, or they are specified such that they do have output states, but involve contradiction. Repairs though non-effective methods or special rules for semi-decidable problems are sought, but not found. The paper concludes that hypercomputing supertasks are impossible in the actual world and thus no reason for rejection of the Church-Turing thesis in its traditional interpretation. (shrink)

A dialogue among statements that try to explain to each other the mechanisms and peculiarities of self-referential assertions and, particularly, of their context-dependence.

According to certain kinds of semantic dispositionalism, what an agent means by her words is grounded by her dispositions to complete simple tasks. This sort of position is often thought to avoid the finitude problem raised by Kripke against simpler forms of dispositionalism. The traditional objection is that, since words possess indefinite (or infinite) extensions, and our dispositions to use words are only finite, those dispositions prove inadequate to serve as ground for what we mean by our words. I argue (...) that, even if such positions (emphasizing simple tasks) avoid the traditional form of Kripke's charge, they still succumb to special cases of the finitude problem. Furthermore, I show how such positions can be augmented so as to avoid even these special cases. Doing so requires qualifying the dispositions of interest as those possessed by the abstracted version of an actual agent (in contrast to, say, an idealized version of the agent). In addition to avoiding the finitude problem in its various forms, the position that results provides new materials for appreciating the role that abstracting models can play for a dispositionalist theory of meaning. (shrink)